Track Record
Every real estate investment I've made — the wins, the losses, and the lessons learned.
Below is every real estate investment I've made. This doesn't include a few non-real estate personal investments that are irrelevant to anything Harvey Capital is doing. For instance, I invested $30,000 in a failed startup I founded in 2020 and lost every penny of it. I also bought $3,000 of Airbnb shares at their IPO price in 2020 and sold the following day for $6,500 (wish I bought more!) I also have slightly over $100k invested in early stage startups that isn't included here.
Long-Term Equity
15415 Rosemont Manor Dr, Haymarket, VA
This was the first house I purchased while I was learning the mortgage business making $15/hr. I knew I couldn't qualify on my own, but that if I lived in one bedroom and rented the other two, it would cover the mortgage. I'd also be 1) living for free and 2) increasing my net worth every month when the mortgage was paid down. My father signed on the loan with me and made this possible, and he put in the cash necessary to purchase (about $8k). He received about $21k back, making this a profitable venture for him as well.
42670 Orefield Ter, Ashburn, VA
This property was my 2nd purchase and I moved into it, and again rented the 2 other bedrooms to tenants prior to buying my next property in which I moved out and rented out 2 bedrooms to tenants and had one listed on Airbnb. Ended up at a 44.34% compound annual return.
43970 Choptank Ter, Ashburn, VA
Again, moved into this house and rented the other 2 rooms until I got married and my wife moved in (wives usually don't approve of random tenants in their house). I was working in the mortgage business at the time of purchase, was making decent money and was fairly cash-heavy at the time, so for the heck of it decided to browse around online at houses. I saw this one online, realized the proximity to One Loudoun and other fast-growing areas, and decided to buy it in less than 30 minutes as the price seemed very attractive. Being that I was in the mortgage business, I knew exactly what the mortgage would be, and I knew the rent would at least cover it as a "worst-case." The downside seemed fairly limited, especially since it would be my primary residence. And the upside seemed tremendous. 55.26% compound annual return.
Hidden Village (84-unit apartment in Mesa, AZ)
This was a passive investment in a property in AZ. I had no role beyond contributing cash. Received a few small distributions while the property was held, although the lion's share came on the back end when the property was sold. I had the conviction to do this deal because the purchase price of the property was at a phenomenal basis and anyone with a baseline understanding of apartments could see this. Ended up at a 30.4% compound annual return.
Goose Island (47-unit apartment in Rockport, TX)
Another passive investment in a market-rate Texas multifamily property. I got in touch with this operator in early 2020 and built a relationship over the next few months. He formed a company with a partner, and both are fantastic Christian guys. When the time came to do this deal, I looked at it and liked what I saw, and decided to do it. This deal has struggled for many reasons though, and I missed A LOT of red flags. The main reason for the poor performance is because of a partnership that broke down. 2 groups joined forces to lead this deal, and the relationship has soured. My point of contact was younger and inexperienced at the time, and partnered with some older, seemingly more experienced guys. We'll call my guys Group A, and the "experienced" guys Group B. Group B turned out to be completely careless about investors, and chose to completely abandon the property, leaving it to Group A to pick up the pieces. In hindsight, not nearly enough capital was raised, and the proper diligence wasn't done on the property, leading to many unexpected large expenses and turnover. I had a phone call with Group A and B prior to doing this deal, and Group B said MANY things that should have dissuaded me from doing this. This is 100% my fault and could have easily been avoided, although in hindsight I am fortunate to learn these lessons for the future. Also, in Group A's defense, they have moved onsite and are personally ensuring that this property is stabilized where a soft landing is the hopeful outcome. While I was wrong about this deal and should have seen Group A's inexperience coupled with some of the "tells" from my call with Group B indicating they were not true fiduciaries; I was right about Group A's character and am grateful for them rolling up their sleeves for myself and the other investors.
Chestnut Commons (48-unit apartment in Emmaus, PA)
This was a passive investment in a property run by a phenomenal operator (Anthony Scandariato). This was my first deal with him, and I was hesitant because nothing really jumped off the page and excited me about this one specifically, but I had conviction based on my assessment of his ability and character. This deal represents a 19.53% compound annual return, and while that is fantastic, the return calculations don't do this one justice. The reason is because 14 months after purchasing this property, a refi was completed and all of my initial cash was returned in full. So, at this point forward I was playing with "house money."
Frontier Apartments (194-unit apartment in Roanoke, VA)
I had conviction to do this one because of the operator and his group (Darius Saeidi with DSP Real Estate). They are first class in everything they do, have a strong collective net worth, and are very experienced. This has yielded over 8% cash-on-cash on average during the holding period thus far, and a few other things have happened that can't be explained with percentages. Within the first year of ownership, the operator acquired a 12-unit property that was weirdly situated in the middle of this property, which was originally 182 units. The 12-unit was sandwiched between both sides of the much larger property, and was a bit confusing to anyone on the outside as it all appeared as a single property. They made an offer at a reasonable price, the seller accepted, and the 12 units were then absorbed into the venture, leading to some efficiencies of scale and scope --- the only drawback was that the distribution was slightly reduced that quarter to account for the purchase of the 12 units. I would've been fine with them doing no distribution, or even doing a capital call, so for them to pick up 12 units and only distribute slightly less was fantastic. Another positive development was a refi where about 1/4 of my initial capital was returned (tax-free). Thus far this one has been a great bet.
Oasis @ Clearwater (76-unit apartment in Tampa, FL)
This is another passive investment led by Anthony Scandariato. Ended up at a 40.97% compound annual return factoring in distributions and sale proceeds, making it a home run as far as passive investments go. My conviction to do this deal came first and foremost because of the operator leading it. The plan to improve the property and ultimately increase rents made sense too, and Florida was not impacted by the covid lockdowns. All of this played into things, although the emphasis was almost solely placed on my trust in Anthony and his ability. As an added bonus though, there are no state taxes in Florida, meaning I only paid capital gains at the federal level, which is great!
Boa Vida 2021 Fund (mobile home park fund)
This investment was made by buying into a limited partnership managed by a group called Boa Vida, who is based in Sacramento, CA. They used the funds in combination with debt to acquire about 30 mobile home parks throughout the U.S. Inflation has impacted things a good bit in the short term, but they have still been paying regular distributions and this should be a great bet long term.
Ocala I (111-unit apartment in Ocala, FL)
Great execution again by Anthony Scandariato. This was a very simple workforce housing type of deal in Florida where the purchase price was sensible, the debt was fixed and reasonable, and the current rents were not up to market. Ended up with a 20.67% compound annual return.
Ocala Paddock (61-unit apartment in Ocala, FL)
Another Ocala property led by Anthony S. --- there are some scale efficiencies picked up here because of the other Ocala property in close proximity. This deal is currently yielding about 8% per annum in distributions paid, and with the rents being increased dramatically since present ownership took over, this one should yield plenty more on the backend once sold. Currently, it is being shopped for a potential sale or refi. ***Update - property was successfully sold and ended up yielding a 16.53% compound annual return.
502 Princeton Ter, Vienna
This property was a thorn in my side from cradle to grave and is a regret of mine. Although the bright side is that I learned many valuable lessons from this. Mistakes are usually crystal clear in hindsight, although hidden prior to that. I sold my last single-family property (42670 Orefield) in June 2021 and vowed never to buy another single-family house. Not even a year later I broke my vow and was back owning a single-family headache. Part of why I wanted to purchase was the rent potential if we listed on Airbnb, and part of it was because I wasn't very busy at the time and needed something to keep me busy. Neither of these were good reasons to purchase the property, and I can assure you that the next time I am feeling less busy, I'll have enough discipline to sit still unless a truly great deal comes along. This deal went from bad to worse after purchasing for a few reasons. The first is that the prior owner was extremely cheap and there were many maintenance issues that came about because of sloppy/cheap work done. The second is because the Fed began hiking interest rates right after we purchased, rates went up, and the market softened significantly. In hindsight, we overpaid for the property in a zero-interest rate environment. Myself, and 2 partners were the owners, and we decided to adopt the Warren Buffett advice which is that when you find yourself in a chronically-leaking ship, energy is usually better spent finding a new vessel as opposed to plugging holes in the current one. This has been a chronically-leaking vessel since we purchased, and we sold at a loss to move on and get away from this. We have thus far realized a loss of 42% of our initial capital, although this will slightly decrease as we settle accounts and receive a few refunds owed (for example - from our insurance premium). It is painful, but it certainly helped mold my investing strategy by teaching me valuable lessons. Debt, emotion, and the inability to wait for a better opportunity is what killed us on this one.
Harvey Capital 2022 Fund LP
This is a small fund I put together used to invest in 6 positions (5 multifamily properties, 1 mobile home park) as limited non-controlling partners. The fund was open throughout 2022 and we bought into different properties throughout the year. I am both the general partner, as well as a limited partner in this where my personal contribution was $50,000. There are no fees charged, and no expenses paid by the partnership (the general partner incurs them). All distributions paid by the properties within the fund flow directly to the owners of the fund. The general partner (me) only gets paid after certain return metrics are hit, and all initial capital is returned to the LP's. After that occurs the split becomes 75/25 favoring the limited partners. Thus far, the fund has performed great with a couple of the properties nearing a liquidity event likely in the form of a refinance.
Basecamp 151 (8-unit motel in Afton, VA)
This property is different in that a partner and I are the general partners on it and are 100% in control of it. We purchased this property using a combination of equity from 9 limited partners, and bank debt. Our plan was to remodel and then re-launch. About 2 months after purchasing this property, we purchased the property directly next door and added a 3/2 cottage to the unit mix. Due to this unforeseen purchase we deemed was in the best interest of the ownership group, we (the general partners) injected our own cash as an interest-free loan and delayed distributions in order to acquire this second property. Both properties are now performing very well and although distributions were delayed, we are now paying about 8-9% on an annualized basis to investors, and a multiple of this should be realized on the back end once this is sold (likely in 2024). We charged no fees on this and will only be compensated if our investors hit certain return thresholds. **update – this property is now under contract to sell and investors will realize a return well above the targeted returns if it goes through.
Osceola Mill (6-room motel/restaurant in Vesuvius, VA)
I would classify this as an opportunistic acquisition that differs slightly from my typical model. The prior owner was in a pinch and asked us to purchase at a price extremely attractive to us, so we did using debt and a small amount of our own equity. ***update: Unfortunately, there were some self-inflicted wounds created because the partner in charge of operations was busy with other projects and didn't have the sense of urgency I had being in a high-interest, bridge loan. I learned a valuable lesson on partnering and on debt from this one. We bought for $510k and sold for $750k. Holding for almost 2 years in a loan with 12% interest is what killed us. A sense of urgency to unload the property sooner would have avoided this. Another error made was getting emotional over the buy price. The seller had previously listed this for $1.5mm, dropped to $1mm, and then dropped to $800k. We started talking to her and she was extremely motivated to sell as she had a sudden life event come up and needed to dump it. When she mentioned she would let it go for $500k, we became euphoric over the idea of buying something this "cheap." But, in hindsight I realized that our discount we thought we got it for wasn't as wide as expected. The lesson there was that just because you can get something drastically lower than what the seller is asking doesn't make it a deal. If one day McDonalds starts selling hamburgers for $100 a piece and suddenly offers them at $25 dollars (a 75% discount!) just because there is a big discount from the original price doesn't mean it's a deal. This was faulty emotional logic and shouldn't have been factored into the decision, but sadly it was. To sum it up, debt and emotion ended up hurting us on this one.
Batten Green (10-room wedding venue in Staunton, VA)
A partner and I again purchased this property together and have full control, along with investors in a similar structure as Basecamp 151. We bought this at a decent price relative to the upside, and feel confident about making the right changes to the property in the form of investment and management to capture that upside.
Harvey Capital I LP (real estate fund)
All real estate investments from this point forward have been made through this fund and details on those can be found in our updates. This is a real estate fund where I am the general partner and our focus is on capitalizing on the gap between public and private real estate valuations. To date the fund's performance has exceeded expectations.
The Rileys Fund LP (family fund)
Small family fund where I am the general partner. The goal with the fund is to find deeply discounted situations/companies. These are typically in odd and overlooked areas of the market. The fund currently owns a portfolio of real estate stocks and wholly owns a cleaning company located in Broadway, VA.
House Flips
| Address | Purchase Price | Sale Price | Net Profit | % of ARV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7526 Alleghany Rd, Manassas | $170,000 | $316,250 | $47,555 | 15.03% |
| 9001 Sudley Rd, Manassas | $204,718 | $399,900 | ~$75,000 | 18.75% |
| 210 Kinsky Ln, Berryville | $344,000 | $503,000 | ~$54,000 | 10.74% |
| 12488 Downey Mill Rd, Lovettsville | $210,000 | $349,900 | ~$111,000 | 31.72% |
| 4041 Ebenezer Rd, Bluemont | $340,000 | $479,900 | $18,676.81 | 3.89% |
| 11447 Huntsman Dr, Manassas | $400,000 | $625,000 | $149,990.24 | 24% |
| 8124 Willingboro Ct, Gainesville | $675,000 | $850,000 | $57,908.89 | 6.81% |
| 8517 Chippewa Ct, Lorton | $310,000 | $389,900 | $16,920.13 | 4.34% |
| 1403 Idaho St, Woodbridge | $255,765 | $424,900 | $117,545.83 | 27.66% |
| 7802 Thor Dr, Annandale | $481,177 | $660,000 | $76,734.71 | 11.62% |
| 200 N Maple Ave, Falls Church | $180,277 | $239,900 | $477.08 | 0.19% |
| 3543 Castle Hill Dr, Woodbridge | $188,000 | $320,000 | $74,659.34 | 23.33% |
| 10762 Lake Forest Dr, Manassas | $375,000 | $594,900 | $80,799.70 | 13.58% |
| Aggregate Total | $881,267.73 | |||
From late 2019 through early 2023 these flips generated $881,267.73 in aggregate.
ARV stands for after-repaired value, and is the value of the property after updates have been completed. We measure risk based on our expected profit relative to the expected ARV. When we analyze a deal, if we conservatively think we will achieve a profit that is 10% of ARV or greater, we will move forward. For instance, if we look at a property that we expect to sell for $400,000 once updated, we would shoot for a $40,000 profit at a minimum.
Fund Updates
Semi-annual letters to our investors detailing portfolio positions, performance, and market outlook.
Growth
Income
Investment Writeups
Detailed analyses of our key investment positions, published on Substack.
Insights & Articles
Thoughts on investing, incentive structures, and the real estate market.
